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1. INTRODUCTION
The Sabbatino decision' appears to be a sound decision in result, but
nevertheless it is submitted that it is not beyond reproach. Lewis Henkin
has already indicated2 that there is a need for the Supreme Court of the
United States to clarify the source and scope of its "independent judicial
lawmaking power" on matters relating to the foreign relations of the
United States.' Actually one could focus attention on many different
facets of the decision, including the following: the classification of the act
of state doctrine in the small but growing body of federal common law;4
the stature of the judiciary vis-h-vis the executive in decisions concerning
foreign relations; the constitutional basis for the Court's judicial law-
making power in foreign relations; the adoption of the balance of relevant
considerations approach in determining if the act of state doctrine should
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 84 Sup. Ct. 923 (1964).
2. Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L.
REv. 805 (1964).
3. The Court seems to find adequate authority for enacting Act of State in the
fact that foreign relations are "intrinsically federal." But the Constitution does not
declare areas or subjects to be "federal." Matters are in the federal domain because
the Constitution granted some power to some branch of the national government.
Does Sabbatino mean that every constitutional grant of power to the Congress, or
the President, or the treaty makers, ipso facto implies also an independent power in
the courts to regulate the subject by common law? May the Court in all such
instances decide on its own authority that there shall be regulation, that regulation
shall not be left to the states, as well as what the regulation shall be? Id. at 818.
4. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383 (1964).
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be applied; the creation of an exception to the above approach so that in
cases of nationalization, expropriation, and confiscation application of the
act of state doctrine would be mandatory. Indeed, the opinion touches so
many legal areas that. Henry J. Steiner of Harvard was prompted to re-
mark, "the Sabbatino opinion and dissent could provide text for a course
on the foreign relations power and on the significance of customary inter-
national law for our national judiciary."5
The scope of this article must be somewhat restricted. The Sabba-
tino litigation extended approximately three and one half years and the
proliferation of legal commentaries which it inspired has been astound-
ing.' Much of the comment and criticism was intended to be persuasive;
moreover, the character of both court decisions7 and legal writings'
prior to Sabbatino were such as to lead one observer to conclude, "It is
apparent that the act of state doctrine as a general rule is being eroded
by an increasing number of exceptions and refinements, some of them
reaching the very core of its traditional scope."9 Therefore, even those
practitioners and students of law who followed the case in legal literature
may have discovered discordant views on the scope, power, and applica-
bility of the act of state doctrine. The rules of law were not clear; indeed
rules of the law of the conflict of laws tended to be interspersed in dis-
cussions of international law. Confusion may have been anticipated had
there been the caveat that the facts of Sabbatino place it on the border-
line between these two rather amorphous and expanding bodies of law.
This border is not well defined; here, concepts tend to blur, overlap, go
through transitions, possibly even transpositions. The purpose of this
study, then, is to attempt to clarify this border zone and to examine what
5. Steiner, Responses to Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 5 HARV. INT'L L. CLUB
J. 209 (1964).
6. To conserve space, the author will not present the myriad of legal commentaries,
many of which are conveniently indexed in the Index to Legal Periodicals under "Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino" in the Table at Cases and "Expropriation and nation-
alization" in the Subject and Author Index.
7. Prior decisions of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit had enunciated the
"Bernstein exception," permitting resort to the forum's public policy in cases in which the
executive indicated to the court that relaxation of the act of state doctrine would accord
with State Department policy. Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). See also Matter of the Claim of Herbert Brower,
United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Decision PO-1634, reported in 58
AM. J. INT'L L. 505 (1964).
8. See e.g., AssocIA'ioir OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW, A RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES
COURTS (1959); Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54
Am. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960); Mann, International Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts,
70 L.Q. REV. 181 (1954) ; Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959).
But see, Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the International
Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 1
(1961) ; Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 Ame. J. INT'L L.
141 (1960).
9. Bayitch, Florida and International Legal Developments, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. 321,
345 (1963).
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rules of law, in the author's opinion, actually play on the Sabbatino
controversey.
A. Starting Definitions
Confiscation is the taking of private property by the state without
payment or compensation to the divested owner.10 Expropriation is the
taking or use of property by the state with adequate compensation, for
example, the compulsory purchase of land and the requisitioning" of
property. Nationalization may involve either confiscation or expropriation
according to the degree of compensation. 2
"Before the First World War cases of interference with private
property by the state which had international effects were few and far
between."13 White suggests 4 that Soviet Russia was probably the first
state to make use of the term "nationalization" in its municipal law.
The term was used in the decree on the nationalization of banking made
by the Central Executive Committee of Soviets on December 14, 1917.
But on the international level of law, the diplomatic protests made to
Soviet Russia after 1917 spoke of "confiscation." However, since the end
of the Second World War many states have enacted "nationalization"
measures, e.g., England, France, Iran, Egypt, Indonesia and Cuba.
Nationalization, expropriation and confiscation are catagorized as
"acts of state." "Act of state" designates an executive, administrative,
or legislative exercise of sovereign power15 in which the state has a policy
interest per se as a state.'6 Foreign judgments, although not necessarily
exempt from act of state considerations, are typically concerned with
private controversies in which no overriding national interest of the
foreign sovereign justifies judicial abstention.
10. See Fawcett, Some Foreign Effects of Nationalization of Property, 27 Barr. YB.
INT'L L. 355 (1950); Van Hecke, Confiscation, Expropriation and the Conflict of Laws, 4
INT'L L.Q. 345 (1951).
11. "[R]equisition . . . is generally confined to the seizure of property in the public
interest for a limited period, usually until the end of some emergency, and in return for
compensation." CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (6th ed. 1961).
12. Van Hecke, supra note 10, at 345. "[N]ationalization . . . is the permanent
absorption of property into public ownership in furtherance of some political aim and
in return for compensation." CHESHIRE, op. cit. supra note 11.
13. Fawcett, supra note 10, at 356.
14. WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOaEIGN PROPERTY 2 (1961).
15. See Note, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 234 (1960).
16. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 28a, comment a
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1960); see RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 41, comment c (Proposed Off. Draft 1962). The "act" usually is a "taking" of
private property by the state for an alleged "public purpose." The "taking" may assume
a variety of forms. See, e.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918) (military
requisition) ; Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 772 (1947) (compulsory sale of stock) ; Soci6t6 Vinicole de Champagne v. Mumm
Champagne & Importation Co., 10 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (sequestration); Holzer
v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938) (foreign exchange
control); Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925) (dis-
solution of corporation) ; cf. Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927) (custodianship).
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Judicial abstention, the refusal of courts to consider a topic appro-
priate for judicial review, had been the position adopted by American
courts with respect to controversies involving foreign acts of state, until
Sabbatino challenged this position. The judiciary has refused to review
and thereby determine the validity of executive, administrative or legis-
lative acts of foreign states. It has not felt free to disregard a nationaliza-
tion on the ground that it did not comply with the municipal law of the
acting state, that it violated the public policy of the forum, or that it
violated some principle of international law. This position of the judiciary
has been dubbed the "act of state doctrine,' 17 and it appears to have
sprung from a maxim in Underhill v. Hernandez that "the courts of one
country will not sit in. judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory.""
Property nationalized by the state may: belong to one of its nation-
als, an individual or corporation, and be situated within its territory;
belong to an alien individual or corporation and be so situated; or belong
to one of its nationals and be situated abroad. Nationalized property may,
for convenience, be classified as local property of a national, local prop-
erty of an alien, and foreign property of a national. A fourth classification,
foreign property of an alien, is not subject to nationalization and will not
be discussed in detail. It is a matter of international legislative jurisdiction
and it may be noted that neither the situs of the property not the nation-
ality of the divested owner would be considered sufficient legislative con-
tacts for a foreign state's nationalization decree to reach "foreign prop-
erty of an alien." The following chart may illustrate further the four
measures mentioned above:
Situs oj
Nationality of Property Municipal or Int'l
Divested Owner Affected Classification Level Affected
1. National of Within Acting State Local Property Matter of Municipal
Acting State of National Law of Acting State
2. National of Without Acting Foreign Property Matter of Extra-terri-
Acting State State of National torial effect under
conflict law
3. Alien to Within Acting State Local Property Matter of treatment
Acting State of Alien of alien, owned
property under in-
ternational law
17. Observe that where the act of state is subject to review in the courts of the acting
state, one relying on the act could be in a better position in an American forum where
the act is not reviewable under the act of state doctrine.
18. The classic statement of Chief Justice Fuller is as follows:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897).
1964]
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4. Alien to Without Acting Foreign Property Matter of allocation




The first measure involves neither conflict law nor international law;
it is a matter of internal municipal law of the acting state.'" The second
measure is an action covered by the rules of conflict of laws. With respect
to the third and fourth measures, the acting state's decree may conflict
with principles of international law.
[I]n international conflicts situations general rules of inter-
national law unavoidably enter the picture, mainly in two re-
spects: by allowing the testing of the foreign governmental act
against substantive rules of international law, as it happened in
the Sabbatino case, or, by checking such governmental acts
against standards adopted by international law with regard to
allocation of legislative powers between sovereign nations ...
[T]he latter test is in many instances performed simply by
relying on domestic conflict rules, apparently under the assump-
tion that a foreign country will have international jurisdiction
to legislate in the matter whenever conflict rules of the forum
declare the law of such foreign country controlling. This, of
course, is but an emergency solution since contacts used by the
lex fori to identify the controlling foreign legal system are not
necessarily the same as those adopted by international law in
determining international legislative jurisdiction.20
In examination of the Sabbatino case, one must bear in mind the
two critical parameters mentioned above:
1. Nationality of the divested owner; and
2. Situs of property at the time of the formal publication or
promulgation of the decree of expropriation or nationaliz-
ation.
B. Facts and Statement of the Sabbatino Case
The facts in the Sabbatino case are not typical of the litigation in
our courts regarding nationalizations. In most of the other cases arising
out of nationalizations, the plaintiffs were the former owners of the
19. Where a state nationalizes or confiscates the property of its own nationals, there
is no violation of international law. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220,
227, 186 N.E. 679, 682 (1933). Cf. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 301 (1918).
But see the Nurnberg Charter art. 6(c), reprinted in the Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69,
77-78 (1946), which raises the possibility that a state may be held liable for inhumane acts
committed on its own people. The principles of the Charter are part of international law.
U.N. Gen. Ass. Resolution 95(1), Dec. 11, 1946.
20. Bayitch, Florida and International Legal Developments, 18 U. MiAmI L. REV.
321,345 (1963).
[VOL. XIX
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SABBATINO
property seeking to recover their property on the ground that the present
owner should not be recognized in the United States. In contrast, in
Sabbatino, the plaintiff in a United States District Court was an agency
of the Cuban government seeking the recognition of a Cuban nation-
alization decree purporting to transfer title to property. The United
States Department of State had described the Cuban decree as "mani-
festly in violation of those principles of international law which have
been accepted by the free countries of the West. It is in its essence dis-
criminatory, arbitrary, and confiscatory."'" At the time of the national-
ization decree, the United States officially recognized the Castro
government.
The facts of Sabbatino have been frequently stated.2 2 The S.S. Horn-
fels, in territorial waters of Cuba, was being loaded with a cargo of sugar,
which was the property of a Cuban corporation owned predominantly by
United States nationals. Cuba enacted a decree nationalizing property of
United States citizens, which included the sugar being loaded. The Cuban
government then sold the sugar on the world market through a New
York sugar broker. The Cuban corporation claimed that it, not the
Cuban Government, was entitled to the proceeds of the sale in the pos-
session of the New York broker. Acting pursuant to a statute authorizing
the appointment of a receiver to liquidate the assets of a foreign corpora-
tion which has been nationalized, a New York state court ordered the
broker to turn over the proceeds to the court-appointed receiver, Peter
Sabbatino. Thereupon, an agency of the Cuban Government, Banco
Nacional de Cuba, the assignee of the bill of lading for the sugar, brought
suit in the United States District Court of the Southern District of New
York alleging conversion of the proceeds by the broker and seeking
an injunction restraining the receiver from exercising jurisdiction over
the proceeds. The broker defended by challenging Cuba's claim of title
to the sugar, urging that the decree did not pass valid title to the govern-
ment of Cuba because the taking was in violation of international law.
Finding that the nationalization violated international law because it did
not provide for prompt, adequate and effective compensation, the district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed, narrowing the depositive grounds.
The degree of discrimination against Americans was held to be a violation
of international law when it was combined with a retaliatory purpose and
a failure to provide adequate compensation.2" The Supreme Court of the
United States in an eight-to-one decision reversed, holding that the dis-
trict court should have recognized the Cuban act of state.
21. State Dept. Note No. 397, July 16, 1960 (to Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations).
22. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 1.
23. For an interesting commentary on discrimination, retaliation and adequacy of
compensation see Dawson & Weston, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New Wine
in Old Bottles, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 63 (1963).
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C. Introductory Foundation
The facts of the Sabbatino case place it on the borderline of inter-
national law and the law of conflict of laws. (In this discussion the term
"international law" will mean public international law, and "conflict law"
will mean private international law.24) Therefore, care must be exercised
to designate whether legal doctrines operating at the international level or
at the municipal level are being discussed. But where is the precise
boundary between international law and conflict law to be drawn?
With respect to nationalizations, it can be said that international law
deals with the responsibility of states for the treatment of aliens in con-
nection with rights of property, so that the important factor is the nation-
ality of the owner of the right or rights involved. On the other hand,
conflict law deals with the juridiction of states and with the sphere of
operation of measures of nationalization and confiscation, especially with
regard to the granting or withholding of recognition of the extraterritorial
effects of such measures. In this connection, the vital factor is the situs
of the property at the time of the act of state which "takes" the
property.
25
The problem of the law applicable on the acts of expropriation,
requisition, and confiscation ... would be a simple one if it were
possible to be studied within the sphere of stricto sensu Private
International Law. Then the generally accepted principle of this
law under which the lex rei sitae governs every transferring of
property would be applied also in expropriation. But the act of
expropriation is a manifestation of state power and springs from
the State the legal order of which does not regulate the right of
expropriation in accordance with the principles of private law.
• . . The inquiry, therefore, into the results of these acts in
foreign countries eludes the circle of stricto sensu Private Inter-
national Law and belongs to lato sensu one which contains the
study of the conflict of laws of every kind.2"
Nationalizations, expropriations, and confiscations are generally only
scrutinized from the viewpoint of international law. But this law alone
is not always sufficient for the ascertainment of the private law con-
sequences of these acts. It is generally accepted that international law and
24. In the continental doctrine the law of conflict of laws cannot be equated with
private international law. For example, in France the questions of nationality and
treatment of aliens are treated as part of private international law. Under this concept,
there would appear to be little doubt of the connection between international law and
private international law. The Nottebohm case exemplifies the question of nationality
determined by an international tribunal.
But aside from this, questions of jurisdiction in conflict law lead straight to concepts
of international law if questions of immunity or denial of justice arise.
25. WiTE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 1 (1961); see Van Hecke, Confisca-
tion, Expropriation and the Conflict of Laws, 4 INT'L L.Q. 345 (1951).
26. Massourides, The Effects of Confiscation, Expropriation and Requisition by a
Foreign Authority, 3 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 62, 63 (1950).
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municipal (national) law constitute two different legal levels, despite the
contacts existing between them. Therefore, in a concrete case, it is pos-
sible for a nationalization which is contrary to the principles of inter-
national law to be valid from the standpoint of private law and to produce
all its consequences. On the other hand, it can happen that a nationaliza-
tion which is permitted by international law will not be recognized by
other countries because the public policy in their concept of conflict law
excludes its execution.
On the international level a state's right to nationalize is limited to
the property within its territorial boundaries. On the municipal level,
a municipal court of another state may "recognize" a foreign nationaliza-
tion to the extent of granting it extraterritorial effect within its own
territory. Such an action on the part of a municipal court would be within
the realm of conflict law and not international law. This means that the
non-recognition of foreign nationalizations or confiscations by municipal
courts with respect to local property, on the ground that such measures
have no extraterritorial effect, does not constitute a limitation on the exer-
cise of the sovereignty of the nationalizing state in international law.
Since the act of nationalization is a manifestation of state power, it is
for international law to set the limits of the exercise of this power.
The role of international law is usually confined to the demarcation
of the international limits within which the nationalizing state will move
in the exercise of its sovereignty.
Private International Law [conflict law] is the appropriate one
to solve all the other problems and especially the problem of
selecting the applicable rule among several ones in order to give
a solution to the conflict of laws that have connection with the
legal relation in dispute.2"
Thus, even when municipal courts have passed upon the legality of
the foreign act, a decision by such a court that the act was contrary to
international law can affect only the rights of the parties in the specific
case in relation to the property which is at the material time within the
the court's jurisdiction. The decision has no effect on the legality or
otherwise of the original exercise of the sovereign right of the foreign
state. It can neither prejudice nor promote any international claim that
may arise out of that act. In the same vein, decisions affording recognition
to the effect of foreign decrees on property situated within the territory
of the legislating state at the time of the execution of the decree may be
27. For the purpose of territorial jurisdiction, besides actual territory it has been
customary to assimilate the following state territory:
a. The territorial sea;
b. A ship bearing the national flag of the state wishing to exercise jurisdiction;
c. Ports.
See STARK, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (1963).
28. Massourides, supra note 26, at 64.
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
regarded as being based on the principle of the law of conflict of laws,
which is a choice of law principle, that the lex rei sitae governs. This
principle legitimately may be viewed as a reflection, on the municipal
level, of the principle of territorial sovereignty in international law.
It would seem pointless to discuss the relations between international
law and conflict law without making quite clear what is meant by these
two concepts, at least as far as they relate to the question of principles
bearing on nationalizations, expropriations, and confiscations.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is concerned primarily with the rights, duties, and
interests of sovereign states. Normally, the rules of conduct that it pre-
scribes are rules which states are to observe; as an example, treaties
stipulate obligations which signatory states alone agree to perform. "It is
rare to find a clause in such instruments ["law making" conventions and
treaties] bestowing or imposing an obligation on an individual."29 There-
fore, although some modern treaties do bestow rights or impose duties
upon individuals, and although the place of the individual in relation to
international law is one of the fundamental propositions being questioned
today,80 international lawyers and diplomats continue to operate on the
assumption that individuals are only incumbents of rights and duties in-
sofar as they are objects, not subjects, of international law.3'
Consequently, a foreign investor whose property is nationalized by
an act of a foreign state must look to his own government for a remedy.
He has no standing to sue under international law. Inasmuch as a state
has a right to protect its nationals and their interests abroad, it is en-
titled to intervene diplomatically or to lodge a claim for satisfaction be-
fore an international tribunal when one of its nationals has sustained un-
lawful injury for which another state is responsible. In theory, the injury
to the individual is an injury to his government; therefore, the claimant
state is deemed to be injured through its subjects and either asserting its
own claim for satisfaction, or asserting its right to insure respect for the
rules of international law. The state seeks compensation for its own in-
jury, which is measured generally by the injury done to its nationals.
At the international level the injured national's only right is to claim
through his state as against the state responsible. Actual practice (e.g., of
the Department of State of the United States) shows that states regard
the sponsoring or espousal of claims of their nationals as entirely within
their discretion. Thus, justice in an individual case may be deemed less
29. STARK, op. cit. supra note 27, at 55.
30. See Kunz, The Changing Science of International Law, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 488
(1962).
31. See Jessup, Responsibility of States for Injury to Individuals, 46 COLUM. L. REv.
903 (1946).
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important than strategic diplomatic considerations. The state may decide
not to espouse the claim on legal grounds or may delay in pressing the
claim for political considerations. It must be noted that prior to the es-
pousal of a national's claim the "local remedies rule" generally must be
satisfied.
The exhaustion of local remedies is a recognized rule of international
law, prescribing that a state may not take up a claim on behalf of its
national and present it to the foreign state for settlement by diplomatic
means, or to an international tribunal for judicial determination, unless
the national has exhausted the remedies available to him in the foreign
state.82 In most cases of nationalization, however, this rule will not come
into operation since the injury to the alien is caused by the application
of the foreign states municipal law, which is binding on the local courts.
These courts are unable to give a remedy for an act which is not wrongful
according to the law which they administer. 3
In the nineteenth century, an expropriation of the property of a
foreign national would have been regarded as a clear basis for an inter-
national claim. At the present time, however, the widening control by
states over their national economies and over almost every aspect of
private enterprise, and the measures of nationalization of different in-
dustries adopted by so many states, makes it difficult to treat as contrary
to international law an expropriation of foreign property for a public
purpose in accordance with a declared domestic policy, when it is applied
without discrimination to the nationals of the expropriating state and to
aliens alike. It is generally agreed that to be valid under international
law, an expropriation of foreign owned property must: (1) be for a public
purpose or in the public interest; (2) not discriminate against aliens as
such; and (3) provide for the prompt payment of just, adequate, and
effective compensation. 4 However, the third requirement for some time
has been under attack,8" and the requirements in general are being ques-
32. Local remedies, as a rule, must be exhausted. See 6 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 987, at 656. See also 5 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 521 (1943); 2 HYDE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 915-22 (1945).
33. "A claimant of a foreign state is not required to exhaust justice in such state when
there is no justice to exhaust." Cf. Cushing v. United States, 22 Ct. C1. 1, 40 (1886). See also
6 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 988, at 677 (1906); Fawcett, The Exhaustion of Local
Remedies: Substance or Procedure? 31 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 452 (1954).
34. There is, of course, authority, in international judicial and arbitral decisions,
in the expressions of national governments, and among commentators for the view
that a taking is improper under international law if it is not for a public purpose, is
discriminatory, or is without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 941 (1964).
35. Communist countries, although they have in fact provided a degree of com-
pensation after diplomatic efforts, commonly recognize no obligation on the part
of the taking country. Certain representatives of the newly independent and under-
developed countries have questioned whether rules of state responsibility toward
aliens can bind nations that have not consented to them and it is argued that the
traditionally articulated standards governing expropriation of property reflect
"imperialist" interests and are inappropriate to the circumstances of emergent states.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 941 (1964).
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tioned.38 In Sabbatino, the Cuban nationalization decree appeared on its
face to be overtly retaliatory,87 and its provision for compensation was
largely illusory. Thus, the divested American owners naturally chal-
lenged the taking as a violation of international law.
The manner in which the divested owners challenged the taking was
rather unique. Generally if the situs of the divested alien's property re-
mains within the acting state's territory and exhaustion of local remedies
proves to be futile, the injured alien must seek to have his state espouse
his claim and press it at diplomatic levels.39 In Sabbatino, the United
See Anand, Role of the "New" Asian-African Countries in the Present International Legal
Order, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 383 (1962); Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property
in Europe, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 1125, 1143-58 (1948); Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 AM. J. INTL L. 863
(1961). See also Domke, American Protection Against Expropriation in the Light of the
Suez Canal Crisis, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1957), where the author expresses uncertainty
as to whether compensation is still a requirement of international law.
36. Compare, e.g., Friedman, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 206-11 (1953);
Dawson & Weston, Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard of Compensation?
30 FORD A L. REv. 727 (1962) ; Doman, supra note 35, at 1127.
37. WHEREAS, the attitude assumed by the Government and the Legislative Power of
the United States of North America, of continued aggression, for political purposes,
against the basic interests of the . . . Cuban economy, as evidenced by the amend-
ment to the Sugar Act adopted by the Congress of said country . . . [and]
WHEREAS, the Chief Executive of the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica .. . has reduced the participation of Cuban sugars in the North American
market . . . [and] WHEREAS, this action constitutes a reiteration of the continued
conduct of the government of the United States of North America . . . [and]
WHEREAS, Cuba must be a luminous and stimulating example for the sister nations
of America and all underdeveloped countries of the world to follow in their struggle
to free themselves from the brutal claws of Imperialism .. . Now, THEREFORE: In
pursuance of the powers vested in us, in accordance with the provisions of Law
No. 851, of July 6, 1960, we hereby, RESOLVE: . . . To order the nationalization
through compulsory expropriation, and, therefore, the adjudication in fee simple to
the Cuban State, of all the property and enterprises located in the national ter-
ritory .. .owned by the judicial persons who are nationals of the United States
of America. . . .Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 927 n.7
(1964).
38. The Cuban decree provided for compensation in government bonds with terms
of not less than thirty years at a minimum of 2% interest. These bonds would be amortized
out of a fund consisting of 25% of the foreign exchange annually received by Cuba from
United States sugar sales exceeding 3 million Spanish long tons, at a price not less than
5.75 cents per English pound. It would seem apparent that, given the reduction of the
Cuban sugar quota by the United States, the funds from which the compensation would
be paid would be nonexistent. Moreover, it has been observed that from 1950 to 1959 the
monthly average price for Cuban raw sugar shipments to the United States, even with the
benefit of the sugar quota, at no time exceeded 5.50 cents per English pound. In only one
year from 1950 to 1959 did Cuban sugar sales to the United States exceed 3 million Spanish
long tons. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 386 n.28 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
Although the above lip service was given, the decree, in effect, did not provide for
any payment. The District Court observed, "Indeed, were the sugar quota for Cuba re-
stored tomorrow, contributions to the compensation fund, based on the ten-year history
of sugar purchases from Cuba before the year 1960, would be non-existent." Id. at 386.
39. Since a relatively small degree of satisfaction is accorded an alien proprietor after
nationalization of his property under the discretionary policy of most states concerning
espousal, more and more foreign investors have sought to protect their investments by
more definite means. One means is through property protection provisions and expropriation
provisions in treaties. Brandon notes:
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States was not called upon to espouse, and did not espouse, an inter-
national claim; therefore, there was no confrontation of two sovereign
states on the international level of law. Instead, since a portion of the
nationalized property departed from the territory of the acting state and
the proceeds from its sale entered the territory and jurisdiction of the
United States, the divested owners sought to recover this property under
the laws of the State of New York. This was a matter of municipal law
on the municipal level of law. It was when Banco Nacional, a state owned
assignee of Cuba's rights, sought recovery for conversion in the United
States that the defense of "a violation of international law" was raised.
When property which purportedly has been nationalized by a foreign
state enters the United States and some action is before a United States
municipal court in respect to it, the relief requested will take the form of
either recognition of the foreign act of state or enforcement of the
foreign act of state."0 It is important for the purposes of this discussion to
distinguish between the two. If the forum finds that the property was
wholly and completely subjected to the foreign act of state and if the
intended effect of the act was to change title in that foreign state, and the
property is in possession and control of a person or someone claiming
under him who acquired title in the foreign state, the relief asked for is
"recognition," i.e., a confirmation of a result accomplished in another
state. But if there was no subjection of the property in the foreign state,
or if the property is not in the possession or control of the person who
acquired title in the foreign state, then the relief asked for is "enforce-
ment," i.e., completion of the uncompleted act of state, or dispossession
of another to vest possession in the hands of the titled claimant under
the act of state.4'
The municipal courts of different countries faced with the question
of recognition and enforcement have observed the problem in different
lights. For example, in England, when a foreign state or one of its in-
strumentalities asserts before an English forum the public authority con-
"[S]tates may limit this right [to nationalize] by entering into a treaty or inter-
national agreement or into a contractual obligation with an alien, whether an in-
dividual or corporate person. Nationalization, which is contrary to such undertakings
freely entered into, is inherently unlawful and contrary to international law."
Brandon, Legal Deterrents and Incentives to Private Foreign Investments, 43
TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'Y 39 (1959).
Also, private and government insurance are additional means of protecting foreign
investment. See WHrE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 251-254.
40. A court recognizes a right or status governed by foreign law when for any
purpose the court treats it as existing according to foreign law in virtue of the rules
of the conflict of laws of some legal system. . . . A court enforces a right when
giving the person who claims it either the means of carrying it into effect, or
compensation for interference with it. It is plain that, while a court must recognize
every right which it enforces, it need not enforce every right which it recognizes.
DICEY, CowTmcT op LAWS, 11 (7th ed. 1958). (Emphasis added.)
41. See Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the United States Rejects
a Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Restores the Act of State Doctrine, 32
FORDHAm L. REV. 631, 650 (1964).
19641
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ferred upon it by its own law, the forum asks: What are the actions which
international law commits exclusively to its forum? They are actions
based on the jus imperii of a state, i.e., a right qua regis, a right
jure imperii, a right peculiar to the supreme sovereign power in a state.
The reason for this is that the "exercise" of a state's imperium ends at the
state's frontiers.42 It is not correct to say that the rights which a state de-
rives from its imperium have no extraterritorial existence, because their
existence is recognized within the framework of the appropriate rules of
conflict of laws. But their "exercise" is inherently limited to the state's
territory. A state's penal and revenue legislation are accordingly limited
to a state's territory. Conversely, where a foreign state pursues a right
that by its nature could belong equally well to an individual, no question
of the imperium of the claim arises and the foreign state's access to the
forum is unrestricted. As an illustration: a state whose property is in
the defendant's possession can recover it by an action in detinue;45 a
state which has a contractual claim against the defendant is at liberty to
recover the money due to it; 44 but a foreign state or its assignee cannot,
in view of the jus imperii character of the claim, maintain an action in an
English court to recover property situated in England, when the foreign
state's title to the property is derived from confiscation, expropriation, or
requisition.45 F. A. Mann explains that "an English Court has no juris-
diction to give effect to a claim, whether made by action or by way of
defense, which in substance involves the direct or indirect enforcement
of the ... [jure imperii] right of a foreign State."46
This may represent the English position with respect to enforcement,
but in theory suppose municipal courts are called upon to recognize the
effects of or enforce official acts of a foreign state. They may be requested
to recognize the effects of foreign legislation or administrative measures
on title to property which has come within their jurisdiction after nation-
alization of "local property of an alien," or asked to apply foreign law
to property which has at all times been within their jurisdiction, as would
be the case with a nationalization of "foreign property of a national."
In such cases, are municipal courts bound to take note of the fact that
the foreign act violates international law and for that reason refuse it
recognition? Morganstern indicates that there are a number of inter-
national law grounds on which municipal courts could refuse to recognize
the effect of foreign decrees.47
42. For the extent of a state's frontiers, see note 27 supra.
43. Union of Soviet Republics v. Belaiew, 42 T.L.R. 21 (1925).
44. Haile Selassie v. Cable & Wireless [1938] Ch. 545, 839.
45. For a different view see WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 527-28 (2d ed. 1950).
See also the discussion in CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (4th ed. 1952).
46. Mann, Prerogative Rights of Foreign States and the Conflict of Laws, 40 TRANSACT.
GROT. Soc'y 25, 46 (1955).
47. Morganstern prefaces these grounds on the assumption that according to the rules
of conflict of laws, the governing law is the foreign law and that it is enacted by a
recognized government.
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First, when the foreign state lacks the competence to legislate with
binding effect upon certain classes of persons and goods because it is
limited by international law, then it would appear that the foreign law
could not be regarded as the governing law, irrespective of whether it is
regarded as valid by the legislating state or not. At one time, through the
doctrine of extraterritoriality, international law limited local law by im-
plying that certain persons, such as diplomats, were not subject to local
laws, but today it is accepted that they are merely immune from jurisdic-
tion.48
Second, in cases in which the acting foreign state recognizes the
supremacy of international law in its municipal legal hierarchy, and in
which its own courts are empowered to review its legislative and execu-
tive acts with regard to their substance or the competence of the body
responsible for them in the light of their conformity with international
law, then the municipal courts of other states likewise may refuse to rec-
ognize the effects of an act which violates international law. In states
where the courts lack power to review acts of state against the yardstick
of international law, the acts are valid even if they constitute a violation
of international law.
Third, municipal courts may refuse to recognize the effects of foreign
acts of state which conflict with international law, but which are regarded
as valid in the state where they are consumated, on the ground that they
are repugnant to the "public policy" of the forum.
Morganstern4 9 explains these grounds as follows:
All these methods . . . whereby municipal courts may exclude
foreign law which is contrary to international law, are those
normally employed by them to test the applicability of foreign
law in the light of their rules of the conflict of laws .... [Conse-
quently] [t]here is ... nothing revolutionary in the suggestion
that municipal courts may employ these means to exclude for-
eign law on the ground that it is contrary to international law.
III. CONFLICT LAW
A. Relationship to International Law
It has been suggested that the grounds alleged to deny acts of state
as being violations of international law may well coincide with the
48. Certain immunity from the territorial jurisdiction is by international law, and by
municipal law, conferred on:
(a) Foreign states and heads of foreign states;
(b) Diplomatic representatives, and consuls of foreign states;
(c) Public ships of foreign states;
(d) Armed forces of foreign states;
(e) International institutions.
49. Morganstern, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Legislative, Administrative
and Judicial Acts Which are Contrary to International Law, 4 INr'L L.Q. 326, 343 (1951).
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grounds alleged to prevent application of foreign laws under rules of
conflict of laws. A connection between these two fields of law is not in-
frequently denied, upon the assumption that conflict rules are municipal
law and that they are applied by municipal tribunals." In 1952, Professor
Cheshire of Oxford bluntly stated, "There is, of course, no affinity be-
tween private and public international law."'" But his opinion was signifi-
cantly modified in a later statement:
It would, of course, be a fallacy to regard public and private
international law as totally unrelated. Some principles of law,
such as the maxim audi alteram partem and ut res magis valeat
quam pereat are common to both; some rules of private inter-
national law, as for example the doctrine of the "proper law"
of a contract, are adopted by a court in the settlement of a dis-
pute between sovereign states; equally some rules of public
international law are applied by a municipal court when seized
with a case containing foreign elements. 2
It is believed that modern doctrine is about to evolve an inter-
national conception of conflict law." Dr. Jenks54 has noted:
[T]here seems likely to be an increasing number of cases in
which conflicts of law will be governed by, and in some cases
cannot be governed except by, international rather than national
rules. In the light of developments of the last thirty years it is
no longer possible to take the view that private international
law is "not only municipal law and not international law" but
"treats only of matters which are by the existing law of nations,
within a State's exclusive sovereignty to legislate upon as it
pleases."
B. General Principles and Exceptions
Conflict law owes its existence to the fact that in the world there are
a number of separate municipal systems of law that differ greatly from
each other in the rules by which they regulate legal relationships.
Frequently, the courts of one state must take account of some rule of
law that obtains in another. Although it is true that a sovereign is su-
preme within his own territory and can elect to refuse to consider any
50. Lorenzen has summed up the "nationalist position" in relation to the conflict of
laws in these words: "The rules of the conflict of laws form a part of the national law
[i.e., municipal law] of each state ... there are as many systems of the conflict of laws
as there are independent states." Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of
Laws, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 269 (1920).
51. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (4th ed. 1952).
52. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (5th ed. 1957).
53. Wortley, The Interaction of Public and Private International Law Today, 85 J.
ou DRorr INT'L 245 (1954).
54. JENKS, THE CommoN LAW Or MANKIND 51 (1958). See also Beckett, What is
Private International Law?, 7 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 73, 94 (1926).
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law but its own, this policy of indifference seems impractical in today's
world and states have found they cannot afford to disregard foreign rules
of law merely because they are at variance with their own territorial or
internal system of law. Frequently, law suits have foreign elements, i.e.,
foreign points of contact. When such foreign elements exist it is not
always certain that the law of the forum should be applied. The forum
looks beyond its own internal law, since the relevant rule of the municipal
system to which the case most appropriately belongs may happen to be
in conflict with the lex fori.5 5 Those rules which determine which mu-
nicipal law should be applied by the forum, the lex fori or some foreign
law, are called rules of conflict of laws. Thus, conflict law is that part
of the forum's municipal law which in each state determines which
system of municipal law shall be applied when the legal problem to be
treated has contacts with more than one state.5"
Conflict law has two functions. First, it prescribes the conditions
under which the forum is competent to entertain a suit (questions of
jurisdiction). Second, it determines for each class of case the particular
municipal system of law by reference to which the rights of the parties
must be ascertained (questions of choice of law). Since the function of
conflict law is complete when it has chosen the appropriate municipal
law, conflict rules do not furnish a direct solution of the dispute; reso-
lution of the dispute is accomplished by the application of the rules of
law of the appropriate municipal system.
It has been proposed 57 as a general principle of conflict law that a
right, power, capacity, disability or legal relationship which has been
created by the law of a civilized nation applicable according to the
forum's rules of conflict of laws is recognized
58 and, in general, enforced
by the forum. There are a number of exceptions to this general principle,
including foreign penal laws, 59 foreign revenue laws,
60 and foreign laws





56. See classification in note 55 supra.
57. DicEY, CONFLICT or LAWS 9 (7th ed. 1958).
58. For a description of recognition and enforcement, see note 40 supra and text
following.
59. Foreign penal laws appear to be universally denied extraterritorial enforcement.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657
(1892). "It is well settled that an English court will not lend its aid to the enforcement,
either directly or indirectly, of a foreign penal law." CHESHnM, P~aVATE INTERMATIONAL LAW
138 (6th ed. 1961).
60. Foreign revenue laws are generally denied extraterritorial enforcement. RESTATE-
MENT, CoNFuT or LAWS § 610, comment c (1934). See Municipal Council v. Bull, [19091
1 K.B. 7, 12 (1908) and more recently, Government of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491
(1954). But see RESTATEMENT, supra § 610 (Supp. 1948), where the Institute indicates that
the law in this area is changing, causing the Restatement to withdraw its earlier view on
the matter.
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repugnant to the public policy of the forum. Refusal to enforce a foreign
penal or revenue law implies no disclaimer of its lawful existence; and
on the grounds that national political policy demands the maintenance
of harmonious relations with other nations, circumstances may require
that its existence be recognized. The exception of "foreign laws repug-
nant to the public policy of the forum" contemplates public policy in
the narrow international sense6 envisioned by Justice Cardozo in a
New York case:
A right of action is property. If a foreign statute gives the right,
the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for
refusing to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him. We
are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem
is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home. . . . The
courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expedi-
ency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal.62
For example, while confiscation of property by a foreign government,
although nondiscriminatory, violates the Anglo-American municipal
policy that there shall be no taking of property without compensation,
this policy is not grounds for refusing recognition to a foreign act of
state confiscating property within its territory.63
Reason dictates, however, that the more directly the interests of
the forum are affected, the more likely the public policy exception will be
relied upon. It would seem that courts would be less likely to find a
foreign act in violation of public policy when a mere defense is intended
or when called upon to recognize the legal consequences resulting from a
fully executed act, than when called upon to use their powers affirmatively
to enforce and thereby complete an uncompleted act of state.64 Never-
61. "The conception of public policy, is, or should be, narrower and more limited in
private international law than in internal law." CHESHiRE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 155.
This is opposed to public policy in its domestic sense which includes the minor policies which
generally underlie constitutional provisions, statutes, or judicial acts.
62. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918)(dictum)
(Emphasis added.) See also Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932)
(dictum); Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 21 (1917)(dictum); Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134
Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947); Fox v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399
(1909).
63. See Luther Co. v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532, 546, where the court,
while recognizing that the confisaction before it would be void in England, concluded that
even if a public policy examination could be made, it could not see how "the Courts could
treat this particular decree otherwise than as the expression by the . . . government of a
civilized country of a policy which is considered to be in the best interests of that country."
64. "No country will enforce an act of state of another country if the act of state is
incompatible with its own laws, but it will recognize the validity of the foreign law within
that foreign country." Reeves, supra note 41, at 645. See also Luthor Co. v. James Sagor
& Co., supra note 63, 645. See also Luthor Co. v. James Sagor & Co., supra note 63, at 545.
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theless, the public policy exception is the conflict of law principle which
permits denial of enforcement and recognition of the foreign acts of state
of nationalization, expropriation or confiscation.
C. Foreign Property of a National
As mentioned earlier, 5 a foreign act of state may purport to affect
the "foreign property of a national" or the "local property of an alien."
The former action would generally take the form of the foreign govern-
ment's seeking enforcement in the forum state of its act purporting to
affect property outside the territorial jurisdiction of the acting state. Now,
foreign acts of state purporting to confiscate property owned by its
nationals but whose situs is within the jurisdiction of the forum at the
time of enactment may be denied extraterritorial effect if the forum deems
such acts repugnant to its public policy. On the other hand, although a
state has a basis of legislative jurisdiction over its nationals and their
property, even though such persons and property are located outside the
territorial limits of the state,66 a conflict of jurisdiction arises,67 since the
state in which an alien is traveling or living also has jurisdiction over
his person and property within its territory.68
The use of the forum's public policy in connection with extraterri-
torial confiscations is unnecessary since both international law and con-
flict law recognize territorial jurisdiction as superior to national juris-
diction.69 Therefore, with respect to a foreign act affecting "foreign
property of a national," the forum state exercises both primary legislative
and judicial in rem jurisdiction over property located at the material time
within its territorial jurisdiction. It might be said that the conflict rule
of lex situs prevails. However, when national policy has dictated, public
policy of the forum has been used affirmatively to give extraterritorial
effect to foreign decrees that would not otherwise govern.7" For example,
65. See text following note 18 supra.
66. RESTATEMENT, CoNPLICT Or LAWS § 63 (Supp. 1948); DIcEY, op. cit. supra note
57, at 663; see The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
67. RESTATEMENT, CoNrFLCT OF LAWS § 42, comment g (1934).
68. "Every foreigner who comes into this country, for however limited a time, is,
during his residence here within the allegiance of the sovereign . . . and subject to all the
laws of the sovereign." Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch. D. 522, 526 (1879). See Darrah v. Watson,
36 Iowa 116 (1872) (recognition of state judgment service on a transient). See STORY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 539, at 883 (5th ed. 1857) ; STRUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 102 (1963).
But see Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) where the position has been recently taken that
presence of a defendant in a state, with no further connecting link, does not in itself confer
jurisdiction upon its courts.
69. Cheng, The Rationale of Compensation for Expropriation, 44 TRANSACT. GROT.
Soc'Y 267, 275 (1959).
70. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937) ; in this line of cases public policy was used to implement executive policy seek-
ing compensation to American investors who had suffered substantial losses as a result of
nationalizations in Soviet Russia.
See also Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Anderson
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if national policy represented by a treaty or executive agreement conflicts
with state law or public policy, the treaty or agreement prevails, notwith-
standing local considerations. 1
D. Local Property of an Alien
When a foreign act of state purports to affect the "local property of
an alien," as by nationalization, the dispossessed alien may seek to obtain
a judgment in a municipal court outside the nationalizing state upholding
his title to the nationalized property.72 The effect of such a judgment may
be not only the restitution of the property to the alien but also in some
cases the payment of compensation by the nationalizing state. This latter,
indirect consequence of the judgment is due to the judgment's discourag-
ing effect on potential purchasers from the nationalizing state, which, in
turn, will induce that state to attempt to restore confidence by paying
compensation. With respect to restitution, this municipal remedy out-
side the nationalizing state comes about when subsequent to nationali-
zation the property is transferred to a private party and the property
finds its way into the forum's judicial jurisdiction. The divested owner
seeks restitution by way of damages in the forum state in an action in
rem or in personam. The forum's conflict rule directs the court to the
law of the nationalizing state, the lex rei sitae.
1. PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM
Normally, following the choice of the appropriate municipal law the
forum is free under its conflict law to determine if the foreign act is repug-
nant to its public policy. In the United States, however, the act of state
doctrine proscribes use of the forum's public policy to avoid application
of such law. This doctrine has been severely criticized;7" perhaps none
v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappy, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E. 502 (1942). But see Matter
of Kahn, 179 Misc. 939, 38 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Surr. Ct. 1942) ; in this line of cases public policy
was used to implement executive policy seeking assistance to an allied government in
keeping foreign-based assets out of the hands of a common enemy.
71. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), criticized in Borchard, Extraterritorial
Confiscations, 36 Am. J. INT'L L. 275 (1942). See Zwac v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 93 F. Supp.
963 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), 133 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd in part, 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.
1956) ; Bollack v. Societe Generale, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1942) which limits
Pink to its facts. it is unlikely that a mere statement of national policy by the Department
of State will overide the forum's public policy.
72. Seeking remedy in a municipal court within the nationalizing state may prove to
be futile. See text accompaning note 33 supra.
73. AssocIAm OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW, A RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATE COURTS (1959);
Fachiri, Recognition of Foreign Laws by Municipal Courts, 12 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 95, 102-06
(1931); Lauterpacht, Re Helbert Wagg: A Further Comment, 5 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 301
(1956); Lauterpacht, Case and Comment on the Rose Mary, 1954 CAMB. L.J. 20 (1954);
Mann, International Delinquencies before Municipal Courts, 70 L.Q. REV. 181 (1954);
Mann, Sacrosanctity of Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q. REV. 42, 54 (1943); Wortley, Ex-
propriation in International Law, 33 TRANSACT. GROT. SOC'y 25 (1947) ; Zander, The Act of
State Doctrine, 53 Ams. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959) ; Note, Acts of State and the Conflict of Laws,
35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 234 (1960); Comment, "Act of State" Doctrine, 58 MICH. L. REV. 100
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has been more scathing than Mr. Justice White's dissent where, after a
preface that "No other civilized country has found such a rigid rule
necessary for the survival of the executive branch of its government
"., he declared that the act of state doctrine is nothing more than a
blanket presumption of validity applicable to all foreign expro-
priations ... [requiring] that all courts ...approve, validate,
and enforce any foreign act expropriating property, at the be-
hest of the foreign state or a private suitor, regardless of
whether the act arbitrarily discriminates against aliens on the
basis of race, religion, or nationality, and regardless of the posi-
tion the executive has taken in respect to the Act. 75
Prior Supreme Court decisions 76 indicate that the act of state doc-
trine applies to foreign laws affecting "local property of aliens" within
the territory of a government which is recognized by the United States.
This doctrine of non-review is a corollary of the principle that ordinarily
a state has jurisdiction to prescribe the rules governing title to property
within its territorial sovereignty, 77 a principle reflected in the conflict of
laws rule that the lex loci is the law governing title to property.78 Actu-
ally, this conflicts rule in itself would have been enough to have controlled
the outcome of most of the act of state cases decided by the Supreme
Court, and as will be shown later, was enough to have controlled the
outcome of Sabbatino.
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF THE FORUM'S MUNICIPAL LAW
In addition to denying application of a foreign law because it is
repugnant to the public policy of the forum, will foreign law be denied
recognition or enforcement if it is found to be in violation of the law
of the forum? As mentioned earlier, the internal policy that no property
shall be taken without compensation may not be grounds for refusing
recognition to a foreign act of state confiscating property within its terri-
tory; but what will be the result if the body of international law is
part of the municipal law of the forum? Actually, international law is
a part of American municipal law, and it is the duty of the courts to
apply and enforce it where appropriate.79 In theory, while no American
(1959). Contra, Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 Am. J.
INT'L 141 (1960); Seidl-Hohenvelden, Extraterritorial Effects of Confiscations and Expro-
priations, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 851 (1951).
74. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 946 (1964).
75. Id. at 960.
76. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918) ; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918).
77. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S. 566
(1897).
78. RABEL, TnE CoimlcT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 30-69 (1959); RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT Or LAWS § 254 a (Tent. Draft No. 5) (2d ed. 1959).
79. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 240, 270-71 (1808).
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case has been found on this point (outside of the lower court decisions
in Sabbatino), when a foreign law is in violation of international law
the foreign law should not be enforced by United States courts. How-
ever, there is a recent English case bearing on this point.
Following the nationalization of its property by the Iranian Govern-
ment in 1951, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company brought actions in the
courts of Aden, Italy, and Japan asserting its title to cargoes of oil which
had been brought within the jurisdiction of these courts. It was successful
only in the supreme court of the Colony of Aden in the case which is
known by the name of the tanker involved, the Rose Mary.80 The com-
pany's case may be reduced to three propositions: that international law
was part of the law of Aden; that the Iranian Nationalization Law consti-
tuted a violation of international law, principally because it failed to
provide for adequate compensation; and that, being contrary to inter-
national law, the fact that this law was valid inside Iran did not suffice
to endow it with validity or entitle it to recognition in courts outside Iran.
The Aden court held that it was entitled to refuse validity to a foreign
law which was contrary to international law in so far as it related to
property within the court's jurisdiction, and it found the title to the
oil in dispute still to be the property of the company. The company did
not fare so well before the courts of Italy and Japan."'
As a learned writer has shown, the Aden court failed to distinguish
two quite separate issues:82 first, whether the legislative power of a
foreign sovereign to confiscate property within its own jurisdiction with-
out the payment of compensation is open to question in the courts of
other countries; second, assuming that the first must be answered in
the negative, whether having effectively carried out the act of confis-
cation, the sovereign is bound by international law to compensate aliens
who have been dispossessed of their property.
With respect to the first issue, there are no grounds that a foreign
forum may deny the effectiveness of legislation passed by the acting state
and recognized by the forum state, in so far as it affects property situated
within its own territorial domain. Whether a certain act of state is consti-
tutional under the acting state's municipal law is not to be questioned
judicially in another country. Its validity cannot be made to turn upon
the nationality of the persons affected; even foreigners who choose to
submit themselves or their business arrangements to a territorial law must
resign themselves to the consequences of a territorial act of sovereignty.
80. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246
(Sup. Ct. Aden).
81. On facts similar to the Rose Mary, two Italian courts, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v.
S.U.P.O.R. Co., [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23 (1954), and Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co.,
[1955] Int'l L. Rep. 19 (1953), and a Japanese Tribunal, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Indemitsu
Kosan Kabushiki, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 305, reached the opposite result.
82. O'Connell, A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation, 4 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 267 (1955).
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Legislative capacity is coincident with power and, short of war, no foreign
State can resist an act of power exercised within the territorial limits of
another sovereign. Thus, title to the oil passed to the buyer by virtue
of the lex situs, and there is no principle of conflict law which would
justify the divesting of its title by a foreign court.
With respect to the second issue, recognition that an owner has been
effectively dispossessed of his property by a confiscating decree does not
deny him of a remedy. No reflection is cast upon the right of a sovereign
state to dispose of property for the supposed good of the community if a
dispossessed owner claims that the state shall make reparation for any
breach of contract. The argument that the dispossessed owner acquires
a contractual or an equitable right to compensation is, on principle, diffi-
cult to resist. At the minimum, the dispossessed owner should be restored
the amount by which the state has been unjustly enriched. Since the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., was a concessionaire, the words of O'Connell may
well be appropriate:
A concessionaire may have his rights ex contractu abrogated by
unilateral action, but that by no means represents the termi-
nation of his equitable interest in the works constructed by him.
That interest may be said to give rise to a new obligation, of
restitutionary or quasi-contractual character, on the part of the
State which benefits from the expropriation. In municipal law
effect may be denied to this restitutionary principle by virtue of
an act of sovereignty; in international law no such act of sover-
eignty renders a State competent to destroy the equitable inter-
est of a foreign investor. That interest falls within the category
of "acquired right." 8
E. Effect of Sabbatino on the Courts' Treatment of Act of State Cases
Considerable authority exists to the effect that a sovereign is bound
by international law to compensate aliens who have been dispossessed
of their property,"' but the majority of the United States Supreme Court
in Sabbatino concurred in the view that "[t]here are few if any issues
in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as
the limitations on a State's power to expropriate the property of aliens."85
In effect, since the substantial consensus of nations on this body of law
was lacking, it was determined that the matter was not ripe for adjudi-
cation by American municipal courts, rather than that there was no
international standard.8 6 A footnote cautions, "This decision in no way
83. Id. at 270.
84. See WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-36 (1959). See
also Mann, International Delinquencies before Municipal Courts, 70 L.Q. REV. 181 (1954);
but see note 36 supra.
85. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 940 (1964).
86. The absence of universal consensus does not preclude the existence of international
law, but a doctrine of international law may be sufficiently contested that its application by
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intimates that the courts of this country are broadly foreclosed from
considering questions of international law."8s7 The Court enumerated
several practical difficulties it envisioned would be encountered if foreign
expropriations were characterized as invalid under international law and
ineffective to pass title,"8 then concluded:
However offensive to the public of this country or its constituant
states an expropriation of this kind may be, we conclude that
both the national interest and progress toward the goal of estab-
lishing the rule of law among nations are best served by main-
taining intact the act of state doctrine in this realm of its
application. 9
Therefore, although international law is part of the municipal law
of the United States, the act of state doctrine precludes examination of a
foreign act of state in the light of international law much in the same way
as it precludes a challenge to the validity of the foreign law on the ordi-
nary conflicts ground of repugnancy to the public policy of the forum.
It must be noted that the United States courts must treat the nation-
alization by a foreign state of the "foreign property of a national" on a
basis entirely different from the nationalization of the "local property
of an alien." It may well be asked whether a different treatment is justi-
fied. The courts of other countries seem to find it within their power to
review fully completed foreign acts of state expropriating property."'
American courts have denied recognition or enforcement to many foreign
laws, otherwise applicable under the conflicts rules of the forum, when
these laws are inconsistent with the public policy of the forum. For ex-
ample, foreign acts of state purporting to confiscate property of nationals
and corporations of the foreign sovereign situated in the United States
uniformly have been denied effect in American courts.91 Foreign penal
and revenue laws are customarily refused enforcement. 2 Foreign judg-
ments are denied conclusive or prima facie effect when the judgment is
based on a statute unenforceable in the forum, when the procedures of
a municipal court should be regarded as an expression of municipal rather than international
policy. See Jessup, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations, 58 Am. J. INT'L L.
341 (1964).
87. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 85, at 941 n.23.
88. Banco Nacional de Cuba. v. Sabbatino, supra note 85 at 942-44. The Court indicates
that the reasons for judicial nonreview via the act of state doctrine are due (1) to an effort
to maintain a certain stability and predictability in international transactions, (2) to avoid
friction between nations, (3) to encourage settlement of these disputes through diplomatic
means, and (4) to avoid interference with the executive control of foreign relations.
89. Id. at 944.
90. Id. at 946 n.1, where opinions of England, Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Italy and
France are cited.
91. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951) ; United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20
N.E.2d 758 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 624 (1940); Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co.,
263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934).
92. See notes 59 and 60 supra.
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the foreign court markedly depart from United States' notions of fair
procedure, and when enforcement would be repugnant to the public policy
of the forum.3 Why then, when these cases demonstrate that American
courts have never been bound to pay unlimited deference to foreign acts
of state, must the additional element-that the property affected is situ-
ated within the acting state-justify an automatic deference to the act,
regardless of whether the foreign act violates international law?
The "why" of the Supreme Court's restoration of the act of state
doctrine appears to lie in the absence of consensus94 among nations and
in the need to avoid the practical difficulties95 which a great trading and
capital exporting nation daily encounters. Mr. Justice White argued that
the latter "considerations are relative, their strength varies from case
to case and they are by no means controlling in all litigation involving the
public acts of a foreign government."" However, even in instances when
none of these considerations are controlling, a foreign act of state na-
tionalizing the "local property of an alien" within its own territory would
lead the forum state under its conflict law to select the lex situs-the
nationalization decree itself. This principle of lex rei sitae, that the lex
loci is the law governing title to property, is adopted by virtually all
nations,97 at least with respect to real property." It would also appear
that the act of state doctrine is a corollary of this conflicts rule which
rests on the deeply embedded postulate of international law-the terri-
torial supremacy of a sovereign.9 However, as it has been criticized, the
act of state doctrine is broader; it is not limited to directing courts to
93. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); ci. The W. Talbot Dodge, 15 F.2d 459
(S.D.N.Y. 1926); Venezuelan Meat Export Co. v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 379 (D. Md.
1935). See generally Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgements Rendered Abroad, 50
COLum. L. REV. 783 (1950).
94. The Court recognized that in the case before it the violation of customary inter-
national law was clear under standards upon which virtually all nations did agree, since
the nationalization measure discriminated against aliens. But it declined to pronounce an
exception to the act of state doctrine for such clear violations, because to do so would lead
to exactly the sort of difficulty in close cases that it sought to avoid by its decision.
95. See note 88 supra.
96. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 950 (1964).
97. It is at present the universal principle in abundant decisions and recognized by
all writers, that the creation, modification, and termination of rights in individual
tangible physical things are determined by the law of the place where the thing
is physically situated. RABEL, Tim CONFLICT OF LAWS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 30
(1958).
98. In the United States of America and in European countries with few exceptions
[He mentions the exceptions Italy, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Czechoslovakia and
Germany, where succession to immovables is governed by the lex patriae of the
deceased owner.] ...the general rule is that the lex situs is the governing law for
all questions that arise with regard to immovable property. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 554 (5th ed. 1957).
All rights over, or in relation to, an immovable are governed by the law of the
country where the immovable is situated. DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 512 (7th ed.
1958).
99. See generally KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 135-72 (1961).
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accept the foreign law "as a rule for their decision," 00 under the lex loci
rule, but it precludes a challenge to the validity of foreign law on the
conflict law grounds of repugnancy to the public policy of the forum and
on the basis of a violation of international law.' 0 '
In answer to the removal of public policy considerations from a
challenge to the validity of foreign law it would appear that
areas touching the foreign affairs of the nation reflect a need
for uniformity of policy in dealing with foreign states, and a
concern for the pre-eminence of federal jurisdiction over matters
of international significance, lest the provincialism of state
courts lead to impolitic judicial decisions offensive to the sensi-
bilities of foreign nations.0 2
The Supreme Court, recognizing the need for uniformity of policy toward
foreign nations, concluded "that the scope of the act of state doctrine
must be determined according to federal law, 'O' which would be binding
on federal and, in dictum, state courts.0 4 It reinstated the act of state
doctrine as "federal common law"' 05 and the "federal" policy expressed
through the holding was determined by the Court itself.'0 6
In answer to the preclusion of international law considerations at
100. Commenting on the nature of the principle established by Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250 (1897), American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) and
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), the Ricaud opinion stated that the
doctrine
does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It requires
only that, when it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted in a
given way on the subject matter of the litigation, the details of such action or
the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts
as a rule for their decision. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
(Emphasis added.)
101. I suspect that a contention concerning violation of international law . .. is
not in substance different from a contention based on violation of the public policy
of the forum. I think an examination of the cases we have seen brought in Europe
as the result of foreign expropriations ...will demonstrate that the same points
made in support of a contention that international law has been violated are made
in support of a contention that the public policy of the forum requires that the
law of the situs be disregarded and that a given act be disallowed as the basis
for a claim of title . . . . [I]t is worth pointing out that the talisman of inter-
national law is not necessarily-or even probably-an additional element to over-
come our proper reluctance to substitute policy of the forum for the law of the
situs as a determinant of litigation in our courts. Lowenfeld, Comments on
Sabbatino, 5 HARV. INT'L L. CLUB J. 215, 217 (1964).
102. Comment, The Act of State Doctrine-Its Relation to Private and Public Inter-
national Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1297 n.123 (1962). The Supreme Court cites this
comment and various constitutional and statutory provisions in support of their deter-
mination. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 10; art. II, § § 2, 3; art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1251(a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(3), 1332(a)(2), 1333, 1350-51, which reflect a concern for
uniformity in United States' dealings with foreign nations, and which indicate a desire to
give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions.
103. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 96, at 940.
104. Ibid.
105. Id. at 939-40. For an up to date appraisal of federal common law and its sig-
nificance see generally Friendly, supra note 4.
106. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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least two arguments may be advanced. It appears that the customary
practice of nations is to apply the principle of lex rei sitae. This custom
appears to be so universally accepted" 7 by nations that it would be very
natural to consider it as a general principle of international law.'08 If
this is accepted, a rule of international law as well as municipal conflict
rules would direct municipal courts to apply the lex rei sitae, the law
of the acting state, and the question of a violation of international stand-
ards would be relegated to a determination at the international level.
It might be noted in passing that among nations there appears to be
greater agreement on the lex rei sitae principle than on the international
standards applicable to expropriated property. Moreover, there appears
to be greater agreement expressed in the decisions of the municipal courts
of nations that a forum should accept the validity of a foreign law appli-
cable in a situation subject to its public policy,"°9 than agreement that
the validity of a foreign law may be questioned in the forum as to its
conformity with the principles of international law."0 Secondly, as Pro-
fessor Philip Jessup has proposed, there are potential dangers when the
Erie doctrine is extended to legal problems affecting international rela-
107. See notes 97 and 98 supra.
108. It is . . . believed that there are certain rules [conflict rules] which are so
universally accepted that it would be very natural to consider them as general
principles [of international law) . . It is perfectly possible that certain rules
have been adopted nearly universally on the basis of justice and equity and even as
a basic principle, and the courts-the national courts in question-have acted in
this way without in any way thereby believing that they have carried out an
international obligation. Hambro, The Relations Between International Law and
Conflict Law, 105 RECUIEL DE COURs 47-8 (1962).
Hambro proposes that the conflict principles of lex rei sitae, lex voluntatis and locus regit
actum appear to be so universally accepted. The lex rei sitae principle is discussed in Hambro,
supra at 53-54.
109. The following are recent cases where title to property subject to expropriation,
completed within the acting state, later was reviewed in a foreign forum: N.V. Verenigde
Deli-Maatschapijen & N.V. Senembah-Maatschappij v. Deutsch-Indonesische Tabek- Han-
delgeselschaft m.b.h., [1959] Intl L. Rep. 16 (Germany, Bremen Ct. App.) (Indonesian
nationalization of tobacco); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co. (The Miriella), [1955]
Int'l L. Rep. 23 (Italy, Cir. Ct. of Rome 1954) (Iranian nationalization of oil); Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 19 (Italy, Ct. of Venice 1953)
(Iranian nationalization of oil); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha,
[1953] Int'l L. Rep. 305 (Japan, High Ct. of Tokyo)(Iranian nationalization of oil). Cf.
Princess Paley Olga v. Weisy, [1929] 1 K.B. 718; Luther Co. v. James Sagore & Co.,
[1921] 3 K.B. 532; the plaintiffs in the Princess Paley Olga and Luther Co. cases were
Russian nationals, and no violation of international law was alleged.
As to pre-war expropriations:
Suits for the attachment of expropriated property have been brought by dis-
possessed aliens in the courts of their own or of third States in connection with
pre-war expropriations, but with the exception of those decided in French courts,
they met with little success. Moreover, the courts based most of their decisions on
municipal law, and did not examine the measures of expropriation from the point
of view of their compatibility with international law. If the particular municipal
court refuses to examine the foreign decree from this point of view, the effective-
ness of the remedy will depend on its concept of public policy. WniTE, NATIONAL-
IZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 264 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
110. Senembah-Maatschappij N.V. v. Bank Indonesia and Twentsche Bank, [1958]
Int'l L. Rep. 38 (Netherlands, Dist. Ct. of Amsterdam); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v.
Jaifrate, [19531 1 Weekly L.R. 246, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316 (Sup. Ct. Aden).
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tions. 1 ' He cautioned that rules of international law should not be left
to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations, which would
most probably be the effect if courts unsophisticated in international law
were to review foreign laws under its principles.' 12
IV. Sabbatino AND THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The District Court's Exception to the Act of State Doctrine
The district court held that although it was not free to disregard
the nationalization on the grounds (1) that it did not comply with Cuban
law, or (2) that the nationalization was repugnant to the public policy
of New York or the United States, it was free to examine the nationali-
zation "under international law and refuse recognition to the act if it is
in violation of international law." The court acknowledged the existence
of the act of state doctrine but believed that the theoretical basis for the
doctrine vanished when the sovereign's acts impinge on international law.
It therefore deemed that judicial review was appropriate under these
circumstances. But to adopt the view that no acts of state should be re-
viewed except those that violate international law would be to assume that
it is possible to tell whether international law has been violated without
examination of the facts surrounding the act. It is apparent that if the
threshhold question (to review or abstain) turns on whether international
law has been violated, then the answer of the threshhold question decides
the case. To decide the threshhold question, investigation should be made
as to whether: there was a taking; there was a lawful purpose in the
taking; the taking was discriminatory; the compensation was inadequate;
and the alleged dispossessed owners held good title prior to the taking.
To answer these, legal proof and legal argument is necessary-which
in essence amounts to judicial review. That is to say, if there is a deter-
mination of the threshhold question that there has been a violation of
international law, this amounts to review and the case has been decided,
since it is very unlikely that the court having found the foreign state
to have violated international law thereafter will award it title.
Therefore, the modification to the act of state doctrine promulgated
by the district court-that no acts should be reviewed except those that
violate international law-in effect is dichotomous with the act of state
doctrine and destroys the latter. In consequence, "[t]here would be judi-
111. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law,
33 Am. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939).
112. The Supreme Court concurred in this observation:
When we consider the prospect of the courts characterizing foreign expropriations,
however justifiably, as invalid under international law and ineffective to pass title,
the wisdom of the precedents is confirmed. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
84 Sup. Ct. 923, 941 (1964).
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cial review in every case where the claimant made an assertion that inter-
national law had been violated."' 118
B. Decisions Reached on Title by the Lower Courts
Believing that the above exception to the act of state doctrine was
applicable, the district court decreed:
Since the Cuban expropriation measure is a patent violation of
international law, this court will not enforce it. It follows that
C.A.V. [the American owned Cuban corporation] owned the
sugar which was held in the present case." 4
Thus, in effect the district court held that the Republic of Cuba had
never acquired title to the sugar, and apparently that the nationalization
decree was invalid" 5 regardless of the intention of the Cuban government
and regardless of the actual execution of the decree by seizure of the
sugar."' The rationale of the court seems to be that the Cuban act of
state was invalid per se because it was contrary to international law.
Consequently, nothing done by Cuba could have the effect of transfer-
ring title.
The court of appeals affirmed,"17 declaring:
Therefore, we conclude that, since the Cuban decree violated
international law, the appellants' title is invalid and the district
court was correct in dismissing the complaint."8
113. Lowenfeld, Comments on Sabbatino, 5 HARV. Ir'L L. CLUB J. 215, 217 (1964).
Such a rule would subject nearly every country in the world that trades with the
United States to the risk that its property would be tied up in elaborate litigation
in the United States. Note that the property used to obtain jurisdiction need not
be the property subject to the alleged taking, for the action brought by the
former owner could be a transitory or quasi in rem action as well as an action
replevin. And note further, that under the restrictive theory of immunity em-
bodied in the so-called Tate letter, a great many countries that trade with the
United States have property potentially available for suit. Id. at 218.
114. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
115. Reeves suggests that the ability of American courts to declare foreign laws
invalid when contrary to international law would inevitably impair the sovereignty of
the United States.
Reciprocally, all courts of all foreign countries would . . . have . . . not only
the power, but in behalf of their own nationals, the obligation, to decide any law
of the United States ineffective if they in turn found the United States had
violated international law, in a manner to affect their own nationals. REEvEs, supra
note 41, at 661.
116. "Cuba's restraint of the S.S. Hornfels must be regarded for these purposes to
have constituted an effective taking of the sugar, vesting in Cuba CA.V.'s property right
in it." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 933 (1964).
REEvas, supra note 41, at 648 indicates that there was even judicial confirmation that
under the law of Cuba the assets of the sugar company had been vested in the Cuban
government.
117. This court relied on two letters (not before the district court) written by State
Department officers which it took as evidence that the executive branch had no objection to
a judicial testing of the Cuban decree's validity. It relied on the "Bernstein exception"
referred to in note 7 supra.
118. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 869 (2d Cir. 1962).
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The court, however, indicated that it recognized the argument that the
wrong under the standards of international law is not in the taking but
in the failure to pay compensation, and that international tribunals have
never granted restitution of the property taken. Consequently, with re-
gard to whether a seizure in violation of international law nevertheless
may effect a change in title, the court acknowledged the possibility of
concluding that the "expropriator possesses good title to the property
seized subject to a duty to pay damages for the injury caused."" 9
However, the court of appeal rejected this argument and conclusion.
In doing so it realized that its holding was predicated on a theory of law
new to the courts of the United States and that under the ordinary rules
of conflict of laws, title to the sugar would be determined by the law of
Cuba, namely, the decree of expropriation of August 6, 1960.120 But the
court reasoned that since invalidation, by municipal courts, of the vio-
lating country's title may be the sole deterrent to violations of inter-
national law and possibly the only relief open to persons injured by a
confiscation, a municipal court should fashion an appropriate remedy.
It thereupon proceeded to misapply international law.
C. The Question of the Applicability of International Law
As mentioned earlier 121 it is possible for a nationalization which is
contrary to the principles of international law to be valid from the stand-
point of municipal law. This is due to the existence of two bodies of law
operating at different levels. Title is a concept of municipal law. Title
to real property is determined pursuant to the municipal law of the place
where the property is situated. Title to personal property is acquired
according to the laws of the place of acquisition and held pursuant to the
law of the place where it is held. The sugar company held title to all its
assets in Cuba, under Cuban law, for it could not have held property in
Cuba under any other law. Title to property is not held under inter-
national law.
The district court cited one case as justifying its determination that
the nationalization decree was invalid under international law and not
effective to transfer title. Also, the court of appeals quoted one paragraph
from the same case.
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
diction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.
1 2
119. Id. at 868.
120. Resolution No. 1, Aug. 6, 1960, issued pursuant to Law of Nationalization No. 851,
July 6, 1960.
121. See text following note 26 supra.
122. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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Reeves indicates 123 that the very next sentence, if applied to the Sabbatino
case, directs the court when not to apply international law. The following
sentence reads:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act, or judicial decision, resort must be
had to customs and usages of civilized nations [customary inter-
national law] . 124
Thus, customary international law is the law of the United States
only in the absence of other controlling law. The case which the lower
courts 2 ' cited for the proposition that a breach of international law
voided title acquired under foreign municipal law was not authority for
this proposition. On the contrary, it directed the court to seek out the
controlling law which, under conflict rules expressed in judicial decisions,
is the law of Cuba. Cuba may by its act have become liable for an inter-
national wrong, but that wrongful act certainly has no effect to retransfer
title and thereby change Cuban law.
Thus, it may be summarized that when tangible property is situated
within the acting state at the time the nationalization occurs, the forum
has insufficient contacts with the transaction to support application of its
own law. The Paquete Habana principle that "international law is part
of our law" would be useful only if our law were applicable to the trans-
action. International law did not become applicable to Sabbatino via the
determination under conflict of laws policy that American municipal
law was the controlling law.
Are there any alternative routes by which international law could
govern the acts which occurred in Cuba? In addition to its being part
of the municipal law of the forum, international law may find application
in the forum if it is part of the municipal law of the acting state, if it
is a superior law binding on the forum, or if it has become part of the con-
flicts law of the forum as expressed through the forum's public policy.
In cases where the acting state recognizes the supremacy of inter-
national law in its municipal law hierarchy, and in which its own courts
are empowered to review its legislative and executive acts, with regard
to their substance or the competence of the body responsible for them and
in the light of their conformity with international law, then the municipal
courts of other states likewise may refuse to recognize the effects of an
act which violates international law.'26 Thus, unless the foreign state
123. REEvES, supra note 41, at 675-78.
124. The Paquete Habana, supra note 122. (Emphasis added.)
125. Mr. Justice White also cites this case. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
supra note 116, at 953.
126. See Morgenstern, supra note 49, at 343-45.
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has accepted a rule of international law as part of its municipal law,127
the forum may not incorporate gratuitously what it considers an inter-
national legal doctrine into the law of the former. 2s In Sabbatino, the
nationalization law, "Law No. 851," enacted by the Cuban Council of
Ministers provided that there should be no review by the Cuban courts.' 29
In states where the courts lack power to review acts of state against the
yardstick of international law, the acts are legally valid even if they
constitute a violation of international law. In addition to this, the Amer-
ican act of state doctrine precludes examination of the validity of an
act of a foreign state when attacked on the ground that it violates the
municipal law of the acting state.30
Is international law applicable as a superior law binding on the
forum, i.e., does international law impose an obligation on municipal
courts not to recognize or enforce acts violative of international law?
No principle of international law requires states other than the state
perpetrating the alleged violation to provide judicial or other remedies.
The Supreme Court expressed its acknowledgment of this limitation
when it avowed that "the public law of nations can hardly dictate to a
country which is in theory wronged how to treat that wrong within its
domestic borders.' 3 '
It would seem that there is a route by which international law may
be the controlling law, and that route is through the availability of
principles of international law in the repository of general principles
which comprise the public policy of the forum and which are applied as
part of the conflicts law of the forum. Mr. Justice White argued that
"it is only because of the application of international rules to resolve
other issues that the act of state doctrine becomes the determinative issue
in this case."'13 2 He pointed out that the majority refused an application
of international rules governing the validity of expropriating property and
yet permitted reference to (1) public international law to determine
whether the sugar was being loaded within Cuban territorial waters at the
time of the seizure, (2) private international law for the rule that the
lex situs governed, and (3) to the law merchant common to civilized
127. See, e.g., In re Fried Krupp Actien-Gesellschaft, [19171 2 Ch. 188.
128. But see Convention on the International Responsibility of States For Injuries
to Aliens, art. 2(2) (Prelim. Draft, Harvard Law School, May 1, 1959), which provides
that a state cannot avoid international responsibility by invoking its municipal law.
129. See Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera-Camaguez de Cuba, 39 Misc. 2d 63, 70-71,
240 N.Y.S.2d 247, 254-55 (Sup. Ct. 1962), in which a pending action before a Cuban court
was dismissed on the ground that all property formerly belonging to the sugar company
was, after Law No. 851, the property of the State.
130. See REsTATEISENT, FOREIGN R io TOZs LAW OF THE UNIran STATES § 42a (Pro-
posed Off. Draft, 1962).
131. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 937 (1964).
132. Id. at 954.
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nations to determine whether, at the time, C.A.V. retained title to the
sugar, which would then be subject to the nationalization decree, or
whether title had already passed to the broker under the contract of
sale. As one writer has replied to this seeming inconsistency:
The answer is that these last three categories of law were ap-
plied not because they were international law but as part of
well-established conflict rules of the forum or as the law appli-
cable to the transaction.
83
Thus, the rules of customary international law were not directly
applicable to the Sabbatino case and the case could have been decided by
application of the lex rei situs, the governing law under the forum's con-
flict law. However, under ordinary conflict law, a foreign law may be
refused recognition or enforcement if determined repugnant to the public
policy of the forum. To close this loophole and to prevent application of
customary international law in situations where it might be deemed the
controlling law, the Supreme Court carefully worded the scope of the
act of state doctrine:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign gov-
ernment, extant and recognized by this country at the time of
suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint al-
leges that the taking violates customary international law."'
The Court provided that the act of state doctrine is to apply "in
the absence of a treaty or unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles."' 35 Treaties and executive agreements, in addition to
being sources of international law, are also the "Law of the Land"'
18 6
that is, municipal law. Thus, treaty law would represent a direct appli-
cation of international law in American municipal courts. The Court
apparently wished to reserve decision concerning its handling of treaty
violations. It seems that this reservation holds true for contractual obliga-
tions between states and aliens as well.' 7
133. Collinson, Sabbatino:The Treatment of International Law in United States Courts,
3 COLIm. J. TRANSNAVL L. 27, 44 (1964).
134. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 131, at 940.
135. Ibid.
136. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (identifying an executive agreement with
a treaty). "A treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the supremacy clause . . . of the
Constitution. Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have
a similar dignity." Id. at 230.
137. See comments of Brandon in note 39 supra.
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V. AFTERMATH
Legislative response was not long in coming. On June 19, 1964,
during Senate hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Senator
Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, dis-
closed that a "proposal [for an amendment] which has been submitted
to other members of the committee-I first heard of it this morning...
involves a rather technical legal problem."' 3 8 After addressing questions
to AID Administrator David E. Bell concerning the Sabbatino decision,
he reported the probability of Senator Hickenlooper's proposing an
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Administrator Bell
was requested to see that the State Department prepare a legal position
on the proposal.
On June 25, the executive branch released a statement'3 9 to the effect
that, "The amendment is intended to reverse the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino . . ." and that,
"The executive branch strongly opposes inclusion of this amendment in
the Foreign Assistance Act."' 4 The statement explained that the pro-
posed amendment to section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which
relates to expropriations and other similar matters, would specify that
no court in the United States shall decline on the basis of the act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the merits or to apply principles of
international law in a case in which an act of a foreign state occurring
after January 1, 1959, is alleged to be contrary to international law. The
amendment would further provide that no effect shall be given to acts
of a foreign sovereign that are found to be in violation of international
law. It allows the President to waive these provisions whenever he deter-
mines that application of the act of state doctrine is required by thd
foreign policy interests of the United States, and a suggestion to that effect
is filed on behalf of the President with the court.'
The statement revealed inter alia that the executive branch con-
sidered the amendment unwise, in that it would have the effect of forcing
the President to decide whether a court ruling on the act of a foreign
state was prejudicial to United States foreign policy at a time and in a
manner chosen by private parties to a court case and not at a time and
138. S. RaP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 449 (1964).
139. Requirement That U.S. Courts Inquire Into Acts of Foreign Sovereigns Unless
the President Determines to the Contrary, in S. REP. No. 1188, supra note 138, at 618.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
The effect of the amendment is to achieve a reversal of presumptions. Under the
Sabbatino decision, the courts would presume that any adjudication as to the
lawfulness under international law of the act of a foreign state would embarrass
the conduct of foreign policy unless the President says it would not. Under the
amendment, the Court would presume that it may proceed with an adjudication
on the merits unless the President states officially that such an adjudication in the
particular case would embarrass the conduct of foreign policy. U.S. CoDE CONG.
& An. NEws 5034 (1964).
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in a manner chosen by the President. After indicating why the Sabbatino
case was not a victory for Fidel Castro, the statement explained that the
consequences of the decision would not be a setback to international law:
"It was merely an exercise of judicial restraint in a highly complex and
volitile area. .. .""4 In reminding the legislators that this was a tradi-
tional area of judicial restraint the State Department cautioned that "it
would be unwise for Congress to foreclose such restraint."
Notwithstanding the objections to such an amendment, on October 1,
the Senate committee-urged on by statements of the Bar Association of
the City of New York, which had previously filed an amicus curiae brief
to the Supreme Court, and statements "of such eminent legal scholars
as Professor Myres S. McDougal, of the Yale Law School, supporting
this amendment. . . ."143-proposed this amendment at the conference
on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses, on the amendments of the
Senate to the House bill (H.R. 11380). The "managers" on the part of
the House regretted that there had not been an opportunity for thorough
study and full hearing on the subject; nevertheless, the conference com-
mittee amended the Senate language "to pinpoint its precise effect" and
"The House recede[d] with an amendment.'
44
On October 2, 1964, the amendment, 145 incorporated into section
620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, was adopted by both
Houses and on October 7, was approved by the President. The comments
made in the House on October 2, very likely express the compromise
reached between the House and Senate:
Our adoption of the amendment now requires the State Depart-
ment, which opposed it, to give the amendment a fair chance to
142. See S. REP. No. 1188, supra note 139, at 619.
143. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5034 (1964).
144. CONF. R. No. 1925, in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5062, 5072 (1964). The
House "managers" apparently were successful in limiting the duration of this amendment
to January 1, 1966.
145. The following paragraph, as a 1964 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, was added to subsection 620(e) (22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which
a claim of title or other right is asserted by any party including a foreign state
(or a party claiming through such state) based on (or traced through) a con-
fiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation
of the principles of international law, including the principles of compensation and
the other standards set out in this subsection: Provided, That this subparagraph
shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not
contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right
acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days
duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking,
or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines that application
of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf
in that case with the court, or (3) in any case in which the proceedings are com-
menced after January 1, 1966. U.S. CODE CoNo. & An. NEWS 4837 (1964).
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operate in practice, and puts the burden on them in our hearings
next year of showing how the amendment's Presidential waiver
provision does not amply meet any problems that may arise in
the actual conduct of foreign affairs. . . . [A]s matters turned
out [the amendment] was one of the most significant aspects of
the bill. Our modification of the act of state rule in the Sabba-




The author realizes that this discussion has been academic and at
best represents only a foundation to the great Sabbatino debate. As
delimited at the outset, its scope has been merely to examine some of
the rules of law which play on this controversy. The discussion was
intended to be objective and has not attempted to touch upon the signifi-
cance of the decision or the solution to the enormous number of practical
or hypothetical questions by which legal commentators will attempt to
test the decision, if indeed the decision survives the legislative attack.
146. 110 CONG. REc. 22849 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Adair).
